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I. INTRODUCTION

567

05/10/2016 13:13:34

* Professor, Centre for Environmental Law & Global Sustainability, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law.
1. Lynda Collins, Material Contribution to Risk and Causation in Toxic Torts, 11 J. ENVTL. L. &
PRAC. 106, 106 (2001); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public
Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 858 (1984).
2. CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 12 (2006).
3. Toxic torts can be defined as torts arising from environmental contamination or a toxic product. LYNDA COLLINS & HEATHER MCLEOD-KILMURRAY, THE CANADIAN LAW OF TOXIC TORTS 1
(2014).
4. See id.; see also Lynda Collins & Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Material Contribution to
Justice? Toxic Causation after Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 411 (2010).
5. The Honorable Beverly M. McLachlin, Negligence Law - Proving the Connection, in TORTS
TOMORROW: A TRIBUTE TO JOHN FLEMING 34 (Nicholas J. Mullany & Allen M. Linden eds., 1998).
6. For a more detailed analysis of the Canadian law of toxic causation, see COLLINS & MCLEODKILMURRAY, supra note 3, at 123–56.
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Common law approaches to causation have historically been based on
the premise that if a defendant’s negligence has caused a plaintiff’s loss,
she will probably be able to prove it. 1 This assumption is untenable in our
contemporary world of immense chemical complexity. 2 In the toxic torts
context, 3 traditional approaches to causation have resulted in undercompensation of injured victims and under-deterrence of chemical wrongdoing. 4 Indeed, writing extra-judicially in the late 1990s, the current Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada noted that “[t]he all-or-nothing
outcome of the [traditional] test [for causation] all too often results in a
‘nothing,’ inconsistent with modern expectations.” 5 Jurists and scholars
have sought to soften the rigidity of the causation element by importing
risk-based innovations into the causation analysis. This Article will introduce and analyze one such innovation: the test of “material contribution to
risk” in the Canadian law of toxic torts. 6
Part II considers the unique challenges that arise in the causation analysis in toxic torts, with a particular focus on the problem of scientific uncertainty. Part III elucidates the stages of the causation inquiry in Canadian
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toxic tort law, including consideration of the standard of proof, the but-for
test, and the new test of material contribution to risk. Part IV introduces
proposals for risk-based reform in Canadian causation law, and Part V presents a brief conclusion. In order to do justice to toxic tort plaintiffs, and
remain relevant in the twenty-first century, Canadian tort law needs to
grapple with the new world of chemically-induced harm by adopting a
broad test of material contribution to risk, complemented by stronger forms
of risk-based liability.
II. CAUSATION IN THE CHEMICAL WORLD
A. Scientific Uncertainty
In the decades since the ‘chemical revolution’ of the mid-twentieth
century, thousands of synthetic chemicals and millions of chemical mixtures have entered the human environment. 7 While some chemicals are
harmless, others have caused untold human suffering. Toxic pollution and
products cause tens of thousands of premature deaths each year in North
America. 8 In the middle ground between known innocuous and proven
toxic substances is a vast grey area of profound and pervasive scientific
uncertainty. 9 Surprisingly, for many thousands of chemicals and millions of
mixtures, rigorous toxicity data is simply lacking. 10 The generation of
chemical safety data has been frustrated by both legal and scientific factors.
On the scientific side, the challenges are manifold. Environmental pollu-
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7. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON TOXICITY TESTING & ASSESSMENT OF ENVTL.
AGENTS, TOXICITY TESTING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY 40 (2007); NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING FOR ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGENTS 99 (2006);
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRINT 16 (First Mariner Books 2002) (1962) (noting that “[f]or the first time
in the history of the world, every human being is now subjected to contact with dangerous chemicals,
from the moment of conception until death”).
8. See, e.g., DAVID R. BOYD, CLEANER, GREENER, HEALTHIER: A PRESCRIPTION FOR
STRONGER CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND POLICIES (2015); JOE THORNTON, PANDORA’S
POISON: CHLORINE, HEALTH, AND A NEW ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY (2000); WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
COUNTRY PROFILE OF ENVIRONMENTAL BURDEN OF DISEASE: CANADA (2009) (estimating that environmental hazards cause or contribute to 36, 800 premature deaths in Canada each year).
9. See generally Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into Probability: A Legal Vision of
Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (2013); Richard Goldberg,
Epidemiological Uncertainty, Causation, and Drug Product Liability, 59 MCGILL L. J. 777 (2014).
10. See, e.g., Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from its Critics, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2011) (“[W]e lack basic toxicity data for the vast majority of chemicals
used in cookware, toys, beauty products, food packaging, and other items.”); see CHRISTIAN HEIDORN,
EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE REACH BASELINE STUDY—A TOOL TO MONITOR THE NEW EU POLICY ON
CHEMICALS 3 (2009) (noting “our very limited knowledge about the properties of substances and their
safe uses”); CRANOR, supra note 2, at 12 (“[I]n general, the probability is that for any given substance
little is likely to be known about it.”); D. ROE ET AL., ENVTL. DEF. FUND, TOXIC IGNORANCE: THE
CONTINUING ABSENCE OF BASIC HEALTH TESTING FOR TOP-SELLING CHEMICALS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1997).
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tants are difficult to trace once released and interact in complex and poorly
understood ways with each other, environmental media and human bodies. 11 Non-pharmaceutical chemicals cannot be tested directly on humans,
leaving only animal testing, which is costly, time-consuming and ethically
controversial. 12 Thousands of new substances are invented every year and
yet neither government nor academia has the capacity (in personnel, money
or test animals) to subject this number of substances to thorough independent study. 13 To summarize, our ability to invent and disseminate new chemical substances has far outpaced our ability to understand them.
On the legal side, outdated processes in both statutory environmental
law and torts have strongly incentivized chemical producers to “choose
ignorance” in order to limit liability. 14 Statutory environmental law has
presumed chemicals innocent until proven guilty, treating the absence of
evidence of harm as evidence of an absence of harm, a fallacy that is
soundly rejected by scientists. 15 In a statutory system that requires data in
order to justify regulatory limits, the rational manufacturer tends to understudy its products in order to limit the risk of adverse results. 16 Tort law has
similarly required the injured plaintiff to present evidence proving on a
balance of probabilities that the defendant’s substance caused her illness,
even where the data to support or refute such a claim are unavailable. Carl
Cranor summarizes the legal drivers of chemical uncertainty as follows:

Against this backdrop of massive (and sometimes intentional) chemical uncertainty, toxic tort plaintiffs have continued to bear the burden of

05/10/2016 13:13:34

11. THORNTON, supra note 8, at 414.
12. See CRANOR, supra note 2, at 105–11.
13. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 773 (1997); Sachs, supra note 10.
14. Wagner, supra note 13.
15. Id.; D.G. Altman & J.M. Bland, Absence of Evidence is Not Evidence of Absence, 19 BRIT.
MED. J. 311, 485 (1995); David Kreibel et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science,
109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 871, 873 (2001).
16. CRANOR, supra note 2, at 13; Wagner, supra note 13, at 774–75.
17. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Because the regulation of suspect substances that enter the market without legally required testing will occur only if a governmental agency
[shows] a risk of harm and a tort action will proceed only if a plaintiff
shows [causation of] actual harm, firms have incentives to resist testing
their products and monitoring them for adverse effects and often they
have not. 17
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proving causation, largely by reference to legal tests that long pre-date our
current chemical reality.
Despite compelling scholarly calls for reform, 18 causation remains a
touchstone for tort liability in Canada. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has described causation as “an expression of the relationship that must
be found to exist between the tortious act of the wrongdoer and the injury
to the victim in order to justify compensation of the latter out of the pocket
of the former.” 19 Causation is an element of the negligence cause of action,
without which there can be no recovery. 20 Even with respect to torts that
are actionable without proof of injury (e.g., battery), the plaintiff must
prove a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and her injury in order
to recover compensatory damages. 21 A voluminous body of scholarship has
attempted to resolve the dilemma of toxic causation,22 but causation remains the single biggest hurdle to recovery for the toxic tort plaintiff in
Canada as elsewhere. 23
B. Legal Uncertainty in Toxic Causation
In toxic tort cases, the causation element can be broken down into two
components: generic causation and specific causation.24 Generic causation
refers to the capacity of the substance at issue to cause the kind of injury
suffered by the plaintiff. It concerns the general characteristics of the substance, such as whether it has been shown in lab tests to cause a particular
illness in test animals, or whether there is epidemiological evidence suggesting a substance-illness connection in human populations. 25 If there is
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 71 Side B
05/10/2016 13:13:34

18. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory
of Justice and Toxic Tort, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997); see Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for
Future Harm, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 221, 234 (Richard S. Goldberg ed., 2010).
19. Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 326 (Can.).
20. Id.
21. See Lynda M. Collins & Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Toxic Battery: A Tort of Our Time?, 16
TORT L. REV. 131, 147 (2008).
22. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 1; Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 4; Gold, supra note
9; Brenda Heelan Powell, Cause for Concern: An Overview of Approaches to the Causation Problem in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 227 (1999); Per Laleng, Causal Responsibility for Uncertainty and Risk in Toxic Torts, 18 TORT L. REV. 102 (2010); Wagner, supra note 13; see generally
Berger, supra note 18.
23. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 148 (1995).
24. See Lynda M. Collins, Material Contribution to Risk and Causation in Toxic Torts, 11 J.
ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 106, 109 (2001) [hereinafter Collins, Material Contribution] (citing JEAN
MACCHIAROLI EGGEN, TOXIC TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 197 (1995); see also Vern R. Walker, Restoring
the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by Rejecting ‘Junk Logic’ About Specific Causation, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 381, 383 (2004).
25. Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 4, at 419; CRANOR, supra note 2, at 91 (chapter 4:
“The science of toxicity and reasoning about causation.”).
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insufficient evidence that the defendant’s substance is capable of causing
the plaintiff’s illness under any circumstances, then the causation inquiry is
at an end. If, however, the plaintiff can prove generic causation, she must
nonetheless show that the defendant’s toxic substance actually caused her
illness in the specific circumstances of her case. To assess specific causation, courts will consider factors such as the nature, duration and concentration of the plaintiff’s exposure as well as other risk factors that might
account for the plaintiff’s illness. 26
Proof of both generic and specific causation frequently founders on
the problem of scientific uncertainty discussed above (and thoroughly canvassed in the literature of toxic torts). 27 In addition to the massive uncertainty surrounding the safety (or danger) of chemical substances,28 the
illnesses at issue in many toxic tort actions are both multi-factorial and
poorly understood, 29 and the injurious encounter takes place at least partly
on a microscopic level invisible to the naked eye. 30 This constellation of
factors has produced three discernible kinds of uncertainty in torts cases.
The first scenario involving the indeterminate plaintiff arises when a
defendant increases the incidence of an illness that already occurs at background levels in a given population. 31 Through epidemiological evidence,
we know that the defendant has harmed some individuals within an exposed group, but there exists no individual plaintiff who can prove causation against the defendant. S.M. Waddams postulates the following
hypothetical:

05/10/2016 13:13:34

26. See Michael R. Hadskis, Finding Our Way Out of the Causation Jungle in Toxic Torts at 11718 (Sept. 1993) (unpublished thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School) (on file with the National Library of
Canada).
27. See, e.g., COLLINS & MCLEOD-KILMURRAY, supra note 3, at 9–37.
28. Id.; See also Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 6 (2001) (“In general, little is known about the universe of approximately 100,000 chemical
substances or their derivatives registered for commerce (with 800 to 1000 new substances added to the
list each year).”).
29. See generally PHIL BROWN, TOXIC EXPOSURES: CONTESTED ILLNESSES AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH MOVEMENT (2007).
30. See Hadskis, supra note 26, at 3; Gold, supra note 9, at 244.
31. See generally Shelly Brinker, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of
the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1289 (1999).
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The defendant pollutes the air and increases the risk to the whole population of Australia of contracting skin cancer, raising the risk, let us say,
from 10 per 100,000 to 19 per 100,000. On these figures, no particular
plaintiff with cancer can show that the defendant probably caused the
disease: more probably than not the plaintiff would have contracted it in
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any case. Should the defendant be liable? If so, should the plaintiff recover full compensation, or only 9/19ths of it? 32

Population-based evidence is clearly sufficient where it establishes
that more than 50% of the plaintiff’s total risk factors emanate from the
defendant’s substance. 33 However, questions arise where risk does not meet
this threshold, as in the Waddams example above. In Canada, causation is a
qualitative, logical and common sense inquiry rather than a mechanistic,
scientific calculation; taking a “robust and pragmatic” common sense approach as instructed by the Supreme Court of Canada, 34 proof of significant
risk will often be sufficient to meet the but-for test in the absence of a convincing alternative explanation. Some claims in this category will fail due
to scientific uncertainty, but in Clements v. Clements, the Supreme Court of
Canada explicitly left open the possibility of causation reform in the indeterminate plaintiff scenario in a future case. 35
The second species of uncertainty identified in the toxic tort literature
is that of indeterminate harm, or mere risk exposure. 36 People who are exposed to toxic substances sometimes require medical monitoring, experience anxiety, or feel victimized by the defendant’s conduct even if they
have not yet contracted a disease (and might never do so). 37 Canadian
courts have thus far declined to answer repeated academic calls for the
creation of a new tort of negligent creation of risk. 38 There is currently no
cause of action in Canada for the negligent infliction of risk alone, but the
injury requirement may be met by psychiatric illness or relatively minor
physical harm. 39 Although there is no Supreme Court of Canada authority
on point, a number of lower courts have also certified class actions for
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 72 Side B
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32. S.M. Waddams, Causation in Canada and Australia, 2 TORT L. REV. 75, 77 (1993).
33. Note, however, that proof of a doubling of risk should not be required. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010) (“Any
judicial requirement that plaintiffs must show a threshold increase in risk or a doubling in incidence in a
group study in order to satisfy the burden of proof of specific causation is usually inappropriate.”).
34. See Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 323–30 (Can.); Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2
S.C.R. 181, para. 59 (Can.).
35. Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 44 (Can.).
36. See JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN, TOXIC TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 332, 348–56 (4th ed. 2010).
37. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004).
38. See, e.g., David Gerecke, Risk Exposure as Injury: Alleviating the Injustice of Tort Causation
Rules, 35 MCGILL L. REV. 797 (1990); Porat & Stein, supra note 18.
39. See Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd., [1997] O.J. No. 3304 (Can. Ont.
Gen. Div.). Leave to appeal to the Canada Supreme Court was refused in 2000.
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40. See generally Brandon Stewart, Just What the Doctor Ordered: A Canadian Approach to
Medical Monitoring and Toxic Risk, 8 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 271, 293–95 (2013).
41. See Collins, supra note 1, at 113–14.
42. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (1980); Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982).
43. See generally In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp.
2d 348, 377–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Emily H. Damron, Reviving the Market for Liability Theories: The
“Commingled Product” Theory of Market Share Liability Enters the Judicial Lexicon, 111 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 505 (2006).
44. See EGGEN, supra note 36, at 216.
45. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market
Share Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447 (2006); Christopher J. McGuire, Market-Share Liability After
Hymowitz and Conley: Exploring the Limits of Judicial Power, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 759 (1991).
46. See generally Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181 (Can.).
47. See generally ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Oxford
Univ. Press 2002) (2001); LARA KHOURY, UNCERTAIN CAUSATION IN MEDICAL LIABILITY (Hart
Publishing 2006) (2003).
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medical monitoring. 40 Thus, there is some hope for Canadian plaintiffs in
the indeterminate harm scenario.
The final species of uncertainty in toxic torts—and perhaps the most
notorious—is that of defendant indeterminacy. In the indeterminate defendant scenario, a plaintiff can show that the particular substance at issue
caused her illness, but it is impossible to determine which defendant is
responsible for her exposure. 41 Such cases occur where multiple defendants
manufacture an identical defective drug 42 or emit a hazardous pollutant that
comingles with other identical discharges. 43 In the indeterminate defendant
scenario, the plaintiff can prove all elements of negligence except causation; she can demonstrate that each defendant breached a duty owed to her
and that she sustained a proximate loss. 44 Moreover, the plaintiff can show
that the negligence of one or more in a group of identifiable defendants
(e.g., a group of manufacturers of a particular drug) actually caused her
illness. However, if she cannot point to the particular defendant or defendants responsible for her illness, then causation is not made out and, on a
traditional analysis, she recovers nothing.
Courts in the United States have addressed the indeterminate defendant scenario in a wide variety of ways, from simple dismissal of plaintiffs’
claims to the development of new forms of collective liability—most famously the doctrine of market share liability. 45 As elaborated below, the
Supreme Court of Canada has gone further, imposing joint and several
liability on all defendants in the indeterminate defendant scenario. 46
These three varieties of uncertainty pose challenges at various stages
of the causation inquiry in toxic torts. 47 They complicate the court’s assessment of evidence and drive choice-of-instrument decisions in the doctrinal analysis of causation.
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III. CANADIAN APPROACHES TO THE CAUSATION PROBLEM IN TOXIC
TORTS
A. Standard of Proof

05/10/2016 13:13:34

48. See Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 323–30 (Can.).
49. See CRANOR, supra note 2, at 162, 182–85, 215.
50. See generally John M. Eisenberg, What Does Evidence Mean? Can the Law and Medicine Be
Reconciled?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 369 (2001); Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in
Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985 (2007-2008); Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Placing and Displacing Science, 6 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 25, 29–32 (2009); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Demystifying the Law/Science Disconnect, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 429 (2001).
51. Palmer v. Nova Scotia Forest Industries, 2 D.L.R. (4th) 397, para. 581 (N.S. T.D.) (1983).
52. Ring v. The Queen, 2007 CanLII 146 (Can. Nfld. & P.E.I.R.).
53. Id. at para. 151. Certification was reversed on appeal on the grounds (inter alia) that causation
was not a common issue among class members, but the trial judge’s distinction between scientific and
legal causation was not disturbed.
54. See Hans-Olov Adami et al., Toxicology and Epidemiology: Improving the Science with a
Framework for Combining Toxicological and Epidemiological Evidence to Establish Causal Inference,
122 TOXICOLGICAL SCI. 223, 224 (2011) (“Indeed, a principle underlying the philosophy of science is
that causality cannot be ‘proven’; it can only be inferred with different degrees of certainty.”).

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 73 Side B

As in the United States, the standard of proof in Canadian tort actions
is the balance of probabilities (also known as the preponderance of the
evidence).48 Although there is no doctrinal controversy on this point, judges in toxic tort actions run the risk of inadvertently adopting the scientific
standard of proof as they receive and evaluate voluminous amounts of expert evidence from scientific witnesses. Unlike judges, pure research scientists operate on a limitless timeline and in a culture that places enormous
value on causal skepticism. 49 Since scientists do not consider a causal link
to be established unless it is proven to a probability of 95% or greater, the
importation of scientific standards of proof into torts cases is a serious error. 50 In Palmer v. Nova Scotia Forest Industries, for example, the provincial court refused an application for an injunction against the spraying of a
pesticide containing dioxin on the basis that there was “no scientifically
acceptable proof of risk to health.” 51 The appropriate question—whether
there was legally acceptable proof of risk—was never answered. In contrast, the court in Ring v. The Queen 52 noted that while the representative
plaintiff’s proposed approach to proof of causation might not “‘lead to a
meaningful scientific answer with respect to a specific dose-response relationship,’ it may lead to a meaningful legal answer regarding the creation
of unreasonable risks for the general public.”53
Any amount of uncertainty may prevent a research scientist from concluding that substance X causes illness Y, 54 but a civil court can make a
finding of causation even in the presence of substantial doubt. In Snell v.
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Farrell, the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that apparent injustices
resulting from the but-for test arose from rigidity in its application, 55 and
confirmed that causation need not be proved to a level of scientific precision. 56 More recently, Chief Justice McLachlin in Clements reiterated that
“[t]he ‘but for’ causation test must be applied in a robust common sense
fashion. There is no need for scientific evidence of the precise contribution
the defendant’s negligence made to the injury.” 57 In other words, Canadian
torts jurists need not search for the transcendent scientific “truth”; they are
merely tasked with deciding whether a causal link is more likely than not.
Having adopted the appropriate standard of proof, courts adjudicating
toxic tort actions in Canada are faced with a range of distinct approaches to
the test for factual causation. First and foremost among causal tests in the
Anglo-Canadian tradition is the but-for (sine qua non) approach.
B. The But-for Test

05/10/2016 13:13:34

55. Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 328 (Can.).
56. Id.
57. Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 9 (Can.); see also Emir Crowne & Omar
Ha-Redeye, Clements v. Clements: A Material Contribution to the Jurisprudence - The Supreme Court
of Canada Clarifies the Law of Causation, 2 UWO J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2012).
58. In contrast to past losses, once causation of injury is proven on a balance of probabilities
future losses flowing from that injury are not subject to the all-or-nothing causation analysis. Instead,
future or hypothetical damages arising from a proven injury are recoverable according to the probability
that the loss will occur. See Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, 470–71 (Can.).
59. See generally Collins, Material Contribution, supra note 24.
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According to the traditional test for factual causation, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “but for” (i.e., in the absence of) the defendant’s breach of
the standard of care, she would not have sustained her loss. Thus, if a toxic
tort plaintiff can prove a probability of 51% or greater that the defendant’s
negligence caused her illness or injury, then factual causation is treated as a
certainty and the plaintiff is presumptively entitled to recover 100% of her
past losses from the defendant. If the evidence falls short of a 51% probability of causation, the plaintiff has failed to discharge her burden of proof
and recovers nothing. 58 A rigid application of the but-for test produces
manifest injustice where the defendant has exposed the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of developing a particular illness that she does in fact contract, but causation is in doubt because of a lack of data concerning the
substance in question. 59 This injustice is particularly pronounced where the
uncertainty stems from the defendant’s own failure to investigate its substance. In his masterful book, Toxic Torts: Science, Law and the Possibility
of Justice, Cranor explains:
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[Given the] woeful ignorance that plagues much scientific and agency
knowledge of the universe of chemical substances . . . it is both possible
and likely that some toxic tort cases are dismissed simply because of ignorance about a particular substance and its properties, leaving wrongfully injured plaintiffs without a remedy, and undermining the deterrence
goal of tort law. 60

In many cases, recovery is possible on a but-for standard where courts
adhere to the legal standard of proof, take a common sense perspective on
causation, and apply the “robust and pragmatic” approach to evidence
mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada. However, even when this flexible, contemporary approach to sine qua non is adopted, some meritorious
plaintiffs will fail as a result of evidentiary gaps that result from a defendant’s intentional choices.
C. Reverse Onus
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60. Cranor & Eastmond, supra note 28, at 46.
61. McGhee v. National Coal Board [1972] UKHL 7.
62. Id. at 4.
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Given the perverse incentive that exists when manufacturers benefit
from a lack of data about their own substances, the idea of reversing the
onus of proof would appear to make good sense in the toxic tort context.
The House of Lords adopted a reverse onus on causation in the toxic tort
case of McGhee v. National Coal Board. 61 There, the plaintiff employee
cleaned brick kilns for the defendant employer, resulting in the accumulation of dust on his skin. The defendant negligently failed to provide shower
facilities for its employees resulting in the plaintiff being forced to bicycle
home each day covered in layers of dust. The plaintiff subsequently developed dermatitis and sued the defendant for negligence. At trial, expert testimony established that the defendant’s failure to provide showers
materially increased the plaintiff’s risk of developing dermatitis, but it was
scientifically impossible to conclude (on a balance of probabilities) that it
actually caused the dermatitis.
At the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce developed a new test for
causation to address this dilemma; he held that “where a person has, by
breach of a duty of care, created a risk, and injury occurs within the area of
that risk, the loss should be borne by him unless he shows that it had some
other cause.” 62 A number of lower courts in Canada initially followed
McGhee, adopting the reverse onus where there was proof of negligent
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creation of risk and injury within the ambit of that risk. 63 Material contribution to risk survives in Canadian case law, but the reversal in burden of
proof on causation was explicitly rejected in Snell v. Farrell, 64 a rejection
that was later confirmed in Hanke v. Resurfice.
D. The Material Contribution to Risk Test
In Hanke v. Resurfice, the Supreme Court of Canada returned to the
material contribution to risk approach articulated in McGhee, but retained
the traditional allocation of burden of proof. The plaintiff in Hanke was
badly burned when he inadvertently placed a water hose into the gas tank
of an ice-resurfacing machine, causing an explosion and fire. Hanke sued
the manufacturer of the machine, alleging that the two tanks were designed
and positioned in such a way that an operator was likely to make such a
mistake and suffer injury. On the question of causation, Chief Justice
McLachlin held as follows:
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63. See, e.g., Wipfli v. Britten (1984), 13 D.L.R. 4th 169 (B.C. C.A.); Powell v. Guttman (No. 2)
(1978), 89 D.L.R. 3d 180 (Man. C.A.); Letnik v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (1988), 49
D.L.R. 4th 707 (F.C.).
64. Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 326–28 (Can.).
65. Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333, paras. 21–23 (Can.).
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21 First, the basic test for determining causation remains the “but for”
test. This applies to multi-cause injuries. The plaintiff bears the burden
of showing that “but for” the negligent act or omission of each defendant, the injury would not have occurred. Having done this, contributory
negligence may be apportioned, as permitted by statute.
22 This fundamental rule has never been displaced and remains the primary test for causation in negligence actions. As stated in Athey v. Leonati, at para. 14, per Major J., “[t]he general, but not conclusive, test for
causation is the ‘but for’ test, which requires the plaintiff to show that the
injury would not have occurred but for the negligence of the defendant.”
Similarly, as I noted in Blackwater v. Plint, at para. 78, “[t]he rules of
causation consider generally whether ‘but for’ the defendant’s acts, the
plaintiff’s damages would have been incurred on a balance of probabilities.”
23 The “but for” test recognizes that compensation for negligent conduct should only be made “where a substantial connection between the
injury and defendant’s conduct” is present. It ensures that a defendant
will not be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries where they “may very
well be due to factors unconnected to the defendant and not the fault of
anyone”: Snell v. Farrell, at p. 327, per Sopinka J. 65
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She went on to articulate an exception to the but-for test that subsequently generated a vigorous and contentious debate among advocates and
legal scholars: 66
24 [I]n special circumstances, the law has recognized exceptions to the
basic “but for” test, and applied a “material contribution” test. Broadly
speaking, the cases in which the “material contribution” test is properly
applied involve two requirements.
25 First, it must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury using the “but for” test. The
impossibility must be due to factors that are outside of the plaintiff’s
control; for example, current limits of scientific knowledge. Second, it
must be clear that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury,
and the plaintiff must have suffered that form of injury. In other words,
the plaintiff’s injury must fall within the ambit of the risk created by the
defendant’s breach. In those exceptional cases where these two requirements are satisfied, liability may be imposed, even though the “but for”
test is not satisfied, because it would offend basic notions of fairness and
justice to deny liability by applying a “but for” approach. 67
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66. See generally Vaughan Black & David Cheifetz, Through the Looking Glass, Darkly: Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 249 (2007); Andrew Botterell & Christopher Essert, Normativity, Fairness, and the Problem of Factual Uncertainty, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 663 (2009); Russell
Brown, The Possibility of ‘Inference Causation’: Inferring Cause-in-fact and the Nature of Legal Fact
Finding, 55 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2010); David Cheifetz & Vaughan Black, Material Contribution and
Quantum Uncertainty: Hanke v. Resurfice Corp., 43 CAN. BUS. L.J. 155 (2006); Collins & McLeodKilmurray, supra note 4; Lara Khoury, Causation and Health in Medical, Environmental and Product
Liability, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 135 (2007); Jill Lawrie et al., The Test for Causation in
Canada: But for, But. . . Maybe Not, 75 DEF. COUNSEL J. 378 (2008).
67. Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333, paras. 24–25 (Can.).
68. See Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, paras. 14-16 (Can.); see also Robin Hansen,
Fullowka v. Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd. and the Material-Contribution Test for Factual Causation in
Negligence, 48 ALTA. L. REV. 771 (2011); Khoury, supra note 66; but see Henry v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 214, para. 98 (Can.).
69. Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 15 (Can.).
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Although the phrase “material contribution” is left without object in
Hanke, in Clements, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly held that the
test refers to material contribution to risk rather than injury. 68 Indeed, Chief
Justice McLachlin acknowledges that the material contribution test for
causation is predicated on risk as the conceptual foundation for liability:
“‘[M]aterial contribution’ as a substitute for the usual requirement of ‘but
for’ causation . . . imposes liability not because the evidence establishes
that the defendant’s act caused the injury, but because the act contributed to
the risk that injury would occur.” 69
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(1) As a general rule, a plaintiff cannot succeed unless she shows as a
matter of fact that she would not have suffered the loss “but for” the negligent act or acts of the defendant. A trial judge is to take a robust and
pragmatic approach to determining if a plaintiff has established that the
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70. Id. at para. 1.
71. Id. at paras. 1–3.
72. Id.
73. Id. at para. 3.
74. Clements v Clements, [2010) 12 B.C.L.R. 5th, para. 64 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
75. Erik S. Knutsen, Clarifying Causation in Tort, 33 DALHOUSIE L.J. 153 (2010).
76. Clements v Clements, [2010) 12 B.C.L.R. 5th, paras. 54–56 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
77. Id. at para. 59 (quoting Knutsen, supra note 75, at 171).
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The plaintiff in Clements was severely injured when she was thrown
from a motorcycle being driven by her husband, the defendant. The accident occurred when the vehicle ran over a nail that punctured the rear tire,
causing it to rapidly deflate; Mr. Clements lost control of the vehicle and it
ultimately crashed. 70 The trial court found that the defendant negligently
overloaded the vehicle and operated it at an excessive speed, but was not
satisfied that the accident would not have occurred but for these factors. 71
The court concluded that the material contribution test set out in Hanke
could be applied since it was scientifically impossible to determine at
which speed and weight the motorcycle could have been brought under
control after losing air pressure in the rear wheel. 72
Applying that test to the facts of the case, the trial judge imposed liability on Mr. Clements. 73 The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that this
was not an appropriate case for the application of material contribution. 74
Citing an article by Professor Erik Knutsen,75 the Court of Appeal held that
material contribution may be used only in cases involving either “dependency causation” (the circumstance in which it is impossible to say what a
third party would have done had the defendant exercised due care) or “circular causation” (the scenario in which it is clear that one in a group of
tortfeasors caused the plaintiff’s harm but it is impossible to identify which
one). 76 In contrast, the court held that material contribution could not be
applied when causal uncertainty results from the fact that the science is
“just not there yet.” 77
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the plaintiff’s appeal in Clements but adopted a test that appears to be substantially similar to that employed by the Court of Appeal. After clarifying that the “material
contribution” test does indeed refer to risk rather than injury, the Court
articulated the following summary of causation:
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defendant’s negligence caused her loss. Scientific proof of causation is
not required.
(2) Exceptionally, a plaintiff may succeed by showing that the defendant’s conduct materially contributed to risk of the plaintiff’s injury,
where (a) the plaintiff has established that her loss would not have occurred “but for” the negligence of two or more tortfeasors, each possibly
in fact responsible for the loss; and (b) the plaintiff, through no fault of
her own, is unable to show that any one of the possible tortfeasors in fact
was the necessary or “but for” cause of her injury, because each can
point to one another as the possible “but for” cause of the injury, defeating a finding of causation on a balance of probabilities against anyone. 78

As it did in Hanke, the Court emphasized that but-for remains the default test in cases involving multiple defendants:
It is important to reaffirm that in the usual case of multiple agents or actors, the traditional “but for” test still applies. The question, as discussed
earlier, is whether the plaintiff has shown that one or more of the defendants’ negligence was a necessary cause of the injury. Degrees of fault are
reflected in calculations made under contributory negligence legislation.
By contrast, the material contribution to risk approach applies where
“but for” causation cannot be proven against any of multiple defendants,
all negligent in a manner that might have in fact caused the plaintiff’s injury, because each can use a “point the finger” strategy to preclude a
finding of causation on a balance of probabilities. 79
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78. Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 46 (Can.).
79. Id. at para. 43.
80. See Wagner, supra note 13.
81. Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830 (Can.) (Cook v. Lewis is the Canadian analogue to Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80 (1948)).
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Thus, although the Court rejects the language of “circular causation”
and “dependency causation,” it has effectively limited material contribution
to risk (for now) to the former scenario. The narrowing of material contribution in Clements poses a risk that plaintiffs who are negligently injured
by chemical wrongdoing will be denied recovery as a result of uncertainty
that is well beyond their control (and indeed, may have been intentional on
the part of defendants). 80 The requirement of multiple tortious causes precludes recovery in many cases and will produce absurd results in others.
In the famous case of Cook v. Lewis, for example, the Supreme Court
of Canada imposed joint and several liability on two defendants who negligently shot in the direction of the plaintiff’s face, simultaneously destroying the plaintiff’s ability to identify which defendant caused the injury. 81
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The Clements approach would inexplicably allow a defendant in the Cook
scenario to “escape liability if he could show that, while he was negligent,
the other shooter was not.” 82 Despite this anomaly, it does provide a remedy to plaintiffs who are injured by multiple negligent defendants and in this
sense provides a meaningful response to the problem of the indeterminate
defendant.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Clements specifically left open the
question of whether material contribution to risk might also apply in the
indeterminate plaintiff scenario:
[44] This is not to say that new situations will not raise new considerations. I leave for another day, for example, the scenario that might arise
in mass toxic tort litigation with multiple plaintiffs, where it is established statistically that the defendant’s acts induced an injury on some
members of the group, but it is impossible to know which ones. 83

Thus, although Clements undoubtedly represents a retreat from the
broader, principled test of material contribution to risk set out in Hanke, it
is nevertheless an improvement when compared to the traditional but-for
approach.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR RISK-BASED REFORMS IN TOXIC CAUSATION
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82. Craig Jones, Reasoning Through Probabilistic Causation in Individual and Aggregate
Claims: The Struggle Continues, 39 ADVOC. Q. 18, 28 (2011).
83. Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 44 (Can.).
84. See generally Gerecke, supra note 38.
85. Wagner, supra note 13, at 833–36.
86. PORAT & STEIN, supra note 47.
87. See generally Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 21.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 77 Side A

Commentators have suggested a range of risk-based innovations, including the creation of a new tort of negligent creation of risk, 84 the imposition of a reverse onus on proof of inadequate product testing, 85 probabilistic
proportional recovery, 86 and the recognition of a cause of action in battery
when plaintiffs are exposed to harmful or poorly understood chemicals.87
The most likely starting point for the expansion of risk-based liability in
Canada is through a resuscitation of the broad Hanke formulation of material contribution to risk as an alternative to but-for causation.
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A. The Case for a Broad Conception of Material Contribution to Risk
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88. See Black & Cheifetz, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 66, at 249; The Honourable
Russell Brown, Material Contribution’s Expanding Hegemony: Factual Causation After Hanke v.
Resurfice Corp., 45 CAN. BUS. L.J. 432 (2007); Cheifetz & Black, Material Contribution and Quantum
Uncertainty, supra note 66, at 155; Lawrie et al., supra note 66, at 378.
89. BROWN, supra note 29, at 445.
90. See generally Cranor & Eastmond, supra note 28 (describing the massive investment in time,
money, and scientific attention necessary to identify the risks posed by any given chemical substance);
Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 4, at 443–44.
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The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Clements is the first explicit articulation of risk-based liability in the Canadian law of causation.
From this perspective, it can be seen as a significant step forward for toxic
tort plaintiffs and environmental public policy. However, the decision
clearly curtailed the broad innovation introduced in Hanke, while leaving
the door open for future incremental reform in the indeterminate plaintiff
scenario. The Supreme Court’s back-and-forth dance in Hanke and Clements suggests some discomfort or even confusion in the court’s approach to
risk-based liability. From the perspective of tort law’s traditional goals of
compensation and deterrence, it would seem clear that a broad form of
liability for material contribution to risk would improve tort law’s ability to
meet its objectives. More plaintiffs who are tortiously harmed by toxic
wrongdoing would receive compensation, and the manufacturers and emitters of toxic substances would have an increased incentive to exercise care
in the investigation and dissemination of chemical products and pollution.
Some critics have expressed a “floodgates” concern, suggesting that a
broad test of material contribution to risk would eliminate the gate-keeping
function of the causation element. 88 Justice Brown, for example, wrote that
on the Hanke approach, “if causation is the only obstacle, it is no obstacle
at all,” suggesting that the demonstration of risk at the causation stage
would be redundant (and thus unnecessary) since the plaintiff already has
to show unreasonable risk in order to establish a breach of the duty of
care. 89 While this proposition may hold true in some contexts, it does not
apply to the toxic tort arena. The defendant who does not study its substance at all, for example, will undoubtedly be in breach of the duty of care,
but will simultaneously make it impossible for the plaintiff to prove a material contribution to risk since there will be a complete lack of data. The
demonstration of material contribution to risk requires a substantial body of
reliable data as well as expert opinion by relevant scientists.90 In some cases, a rigorous data set may in fact demonstrate an absence of material risk.
In other words, proof of generic causation under a broad conception of
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B. Stronger Risk-based Reforms
Recognizing the profound vulnerability of individuals exposed to toxic substances and the converse informational advantage enjoyed by toxic
defendants, it seems just to reverse the burden of proof of causation, once a
plaintiff has demonstrated material increase in risk or a negligent failure to
investigate. Reversing the burden of proof on causation is perhaps the single biggest contribution tort law could make to the generation of safety data
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91. See generally Jerry V. DeMarco, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Recognition of Fundamental Environmental Values: What Could Be Next in Canadian Environmental Law?, 17 J. ENVTL. L. &
PRAC. 159 (2007).
92. Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-In-Fact: Alternative
Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 311, 316
(1990).
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material contribution to risk would remain a formidable obstacle to recovery.
In addition to data demonstrating generic causation, plaintiffs seeking
to prove a material contribution to risk would also have to adduce evidence
concerning the nature of their exposure to the defendant’s substance including concentrations, duration, etc. Thus, in many cases the principled riskbased test articulated in Hanke would defeat a claim for chemically induced
damages; the gate-keeping function of causation remains intact under this
approach.
Taking a broader, instrumentalist approach to tort doctrine, 91 it seems
clear that the expansion of risk-based liability in Canadian tort law would
serve the public interest in environmental health protection. The postClements, narrow version of risk-based liability privileges defendants who
release substances that increase the risk to a population of people but lack
sufficient data to ground a finding of but-for causation in any individual
case. The Clements test only applies in the rare case where the substanceillness connection is clear and the one remaining area of uncertainty is
whose product or pollution harmed the plaintiff.
As explained above, with respect to many thousands of chemicals,
there is inadequate data to prove causation of harm on a but-for test, even
when it is clear that the defendant has exposed people to an unreasonable
toxic risk. Defendants have the ability to test their substances, and profit
from their production and dissemination; plaintiffs bear the risk of exposure and illness. In this context, there is a compelling argument that as between a negligent defendant and an innocent plaintiff, the former should
bear the burden of risk. 92
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93. Wagner, supra note 13, at 833.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also Berger, supra note 18.
96. See generally Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 21.
97. Wagner, supra note 13, at 833–34.
98. See generally Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 21.
99. Id. at 134 et seq.
100. Swanson v. Mallow, [1991] 5 W.W.R. 454 (Can. Sask. Q.B.), aff’d, [1992] 2 W.W.R. 718
(Can. Sask. C.A.).
101. MacDonald v Sebastian, [1987] 81 N.S.R. 2d 189 (Can. N.S. T.D.).
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on chemical substances. 93 Currently, the rules of causation reward those
defendants who produce minimal data, thus precluding a finding of toxicity. Even the broad test of material contribution to risk articulated in Hanke
cannot be met if there is little or no safety data on the relevant substance.94
One way to avoid this perverse incentive is to impose liability for a failure
to discover and disseminate adequate information concerning a given product or substance, as proposed by Wendy Wagner and Margaret Berger. 95
Such liability may be framed in battery96 or in negligence. In a negligence
action, the plaintiff should be required to prove that the defendant did not
conduct adequate investigations and/or disclose relevant information, at
which point the burden of proof on causation should be reversed. 97 This
formulation reverses the incentive structure inherent in the traditional approach by penalizing the manufacture of ignorance and aligning defendants’ commercial interests with the societal interest in constraining the
release of hazardous or poorly understood chemical substances.
In the battery formulation, liability is imposed based on the defendant
knowingly exposing a particular population or individual plaintiff to
“harmful or offensive contact” through a toxic or poorly understood substance. 98 Involuntary touching by a toxic substance clearly meets the definition of “harmful or offensive contact” and touching by a substance that is
not well understood may be viewed as involuntary experimentation—a
recognized species of battery in Canada.99 Canadian torts jurisprudence has
already recognized small-scale toxic battery actions. In one case the court
imposed liability where striking workers introduced a chemical spray into
the air system of a truck driven by a replacement worker. 100 In another, the
court held a landlord liable in “either negligence or battery” for knowingly
supplying drinking water contaminated with arsenic to his tenants.101
Recognition of larger-scale pollution or provision of toxic products as
forms of battery would vindicate the right of Canadian citizens to control
their own bodies and would incentivize companies to choose safer products
and minimize pollution.
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Whether framed in negligence or battery, recovery for mere risk exposure (i.e., without present injury) raises questions as to timing and quantification of damages. Ariel Porat and Alex Stein argue that plaintiffs who are
exposed to risk should be able to recover an amount proportional to the
probability of their incurring the potential injury. 102 They further suggest
that plaintiffs should have the option of suing before or after the risk materializes; those who sue for risk alone would be foreclosed from returning to
court if the illness ultimately does materialize.103 Probabilistic proportional
recovery for risk alone would appear to be well beyond the conceptual
grasp of current Canadian jurisprudence.
However, recovery in battery for involuntary chemical touchings is a
recognized cause of action in Canada, and a reversal in burden of proof on
causation in negligence actions was at least entertained by the Supreme
Court of Canada and lower courts in previous decades. 104 It is possible that
given the right set of facts, the Court might be willing to revisit this proposal.
V. CONCLUSION
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102. See generally PORAT & STEIN, supra note 47.
103. See, e.g., Porat & Stein, supra note 18, at 233–34; see also John M. Darley et al., Doing
Wrong Without Creating Harm, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 30 (2010).
104. See, e.g., Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 326–27 (Can.).
105. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382 (1916); Buckley v. Mott, [1919] 50
D.L.R. 408 (N.C. S.C.); Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] UKHL 100.
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There are moments in history when courts are faced with novel harms
and must develop novel responses. In the decades following the industrial
revolution, for example, society faced an unprecedented form of risk resulting from the new phenomenon of mass production. For the first time, consumers could be exposed to risks created by manufacturers who were far
away and socially unaccountable to a person injured by their products.
Courts responded with a groundbreaking innovation in the duty of care
element of negligence—the articulation of a principled approach that
broadened duty beyond the confines of historically recognized categories. 105 Less than a century later, courts in Canada and elsewhere are beginning to recognize yet another unprecedented universe of risks resulting
from the burgeoning production and dissemination of chemical products
and pollution. Scholars and litigants are asking courts to rise to this challenge just as their predecessors did in response to industrialization.
The introduction of material contribution to risk as an alternative to
but-for causation is a baby step in the evolution of Canadian toxic tort law.
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An expansion of risk-based liability through the broadening of material
contribution (per Hanke), the imposition of a reverse onus on proof of inadequate testing, and the recognition of toxic battery would go further towards protecting the health of Canadian people and ecosystems. Given the
dearth of chemical safety data, and the profound vulnerability of exposed
populations, calls for these and other risk-based reforms are likely to persist
until they are answered.
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